言必所指？

章节摘录

I do assert a distinction throughout these essays which, becauseit may seem either controversial or trivial, I want to call attention tofrom the beginning－a distinction between the modern and the tra-ditional, in philosophy and out. My claim is not that all contempo-rary philosophy which is good is modern; but the various discussionsabout the modern I am led to in the course of these essays are thebest I can offer in explanation of the way I have written, or the wayI would wish to write. The essential fact of （what I refer to as） themodern lies in the relation between the present practice of an enter-prise and the history of that enterprise, in the fact that this re-lation has become problematic. Innovation in philosophy has char-acteristically gone together with a repudiation－a specifically castrepudiation——of most of the history of the subject. But in the laterWittgenstein （and, I would now add, in Heidegger's Being and Time）the repudiation of the past has a transformed significance, as thoughcontaining the consciousness that history will not go away, exceptthrough our perfect acknowledgment of it （in particular, ouracknowledgment that it is not past）, and that one's own practice andambition can be identified only against the continuous experienceof the past. （This new significance in philosophical repudiation itselfhas a history. Its most obvious precursor is Hegel, but it begins, Ibelieve, in Kant. For it is in Kant that one finds an explicit recogni-tion that the terms in which the past is criticized are specific to one'sown position, and require justification from within that position. Aclear instance of such a Kantian term of criticism is his characteri-zation of an opposed "Idealism" as making the world "empiricallyideal and transcendentally real"; another is his diagnosis of "dialec-tical illusion."） But "the past" does not in this context refer simplyto the historical past; it refers to one's own past, to what is past, orwhat has passed, within oneself. One could say that in a modernistsituation "past" loses its temporal accent and means anything "notpresent." Meaning what one says becomes a matter of making one'ssense present to oneself. This is the way I understand Wittgenstein'shaving described his later philosophy as an effort to "bring wordsback" to their everyday use （Philosophical Investigations, 6; myemphasis）, as though the words we use in philosophy, in any reflec-tion about our concerns, are away.

前言

改革开放30年以来，我国的图书出版业发展迅速，日新月异。近10年，国内一些出版社经授权直接印行外版文学批评与理论的著作，并以国内同类产品的价格标价，受到大学师生和研究者由衷的欢迎。在这些图书中，上海外语教育出版社从剑桥大学出版社引进的“剑桥文学指南丛书”尤其成功，它们大大推进了我国英语文学的教学与研究。20世纪下半叶是众多文学理论各领风骚的50年，文学研究的面貌大大改观，理论家和批评家取得了与诗人、作家几乎平起平坐的地位。正是各种文论使我们意识到，我们不能一直处于一种天真的状态，对主导批评活动的或明或暗的方法、预设和前提不加追问。上世纪70、80年代开始，欧美大学文学系对理论课程的需求迅速增长，一些文论选本和文论导读、入门也应运而生，有的还被译成了中文，在大学师生中很受欢迎。这些辅助性的指南固然有其用处，但是要了解文论的精髓，我们还是应该暂时把二手译作放在一边，回到原著。

内容概要

作者：(美国)卡维尔(Stanley Cavell) 合著者：江怡

书籍目录

PermissionsAcknowledgmentsPreface to Updated Edition of Must We Mean What We Say?Foreword: An Audience for Philosophy  Ⅰ Must We Mean What We Say?  Ⅱ The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy  Ⅲ Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy  Ⅳ Austin at Criticism  Ⅴ Ending the Waiting Game: A Reading of Beckett's Endgame  Ⅵ Kierkegaard's On Authority and Revelation  Ⅶ Music Discomposed  Ⅷ A Matter of Meaning It  Ⅸ Knowing and Acknowledging  Ⅹ The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King LearThematic IndexIndex of Names

编辑推荐

《言必所指?》：外教社西方文论学丛书。

作者简介

《言必所指?》是卡维尔（Stanley Cavell）的一部文集，共收录了十篇文章，涉及的内容包括了哲学、文学、戏剧、音乐等。卡维尔在书中第一次提出了这样的问题：哲学与文学是否可以清晰地划分开来？他认为，虽然我们无法完全否定哲学与文学之间的区别，但我们通常却并没有真正理解这两者之间的区别，而这样的区别其实如同哲学与科学、哲学与艺术以及哲学与神学之间的区别一样容易发生混淆。可以看出，卡维尔的目的并不是要安全否认哲学与文学的不同，相反，他是要从这两种不同的科学的自身性质上去理解它们的特征，由此更好地理解它们之间的区别。

图书封面

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