功利主义
出版社:中国社会科学出版社
出版日期:1992
ISBN:9787500411697
作者:(澳) 斯马特 Smart, J.J.C.,(英) 威廉斯 Williams, Bernard
页数:154页
内容概要
正如这本书的标题所表明的．在今天，功利主义作为一种道德哲学和政治哲学正处于这样一种境地：其讨论者日益鲜明地站在对立的营垒中，进行直接而尖锐的争论，或批评之，或为之辩护，中间的公允已越来越不可能。造成这种状况的原因之一是美国当代道德哲学家约翰·罗尔斯的正义理论的提出。罗尔斯明确而系统地阐述了一种契约论伦理观，以对抗在道德哲学与政治哲学中一直占主导地位的功利主义。这一理论的提出使哲学家们不得不重新审视自己对于功利主义的观点，决定对它是取是舍。
在为它辩护的人们中，许多人意识到必须对这一理论的古典形式作必要修正，使之能避开某些严重的批评。本书作者之一，澳大利亚哲学家斯马持就属于这一营垒。
另一方面，反对它的哲学家们也不得不考虑是站在契约论一边来反对它，还是以某种其它理论为依据。本书的另一位作者，英国哲学家威廉斯，代表着从怀疑论立场对劝利主义的批评。
书中的这两篇文献是这两位作者的代表性著作，具有高度的权威性和学术价值，是了解现代功利主义理论的必读文献。
斯马特1920年生于英国剑桥，学术上深受英国传统的功利主义思想的影响。其哲学教育完成于牛津大学，尔后先后执教于澳大利亚阿德莱德大学和国立大学。斯马持以其直率的功利主义观点著称。他的学说通常被称为行动功利主义，因为他主张行动的正确(或正当)或错误直接取决于其后果的好或坏。与此相对照，一种被称为准则功利主义的学说主张行动的正确或错误取决于所循准则的一般后果的好或坏。
威廉斯1929年生于英国伦敦财近，就学于牛津巴利奥学院。哲学观点和方法上受休谟主义影响。1967—1979年担任剑桥大学奈特布里奇道德哲学教授。后接任国王学院院长。威廉斯在道德哲学上持经验主义怀疑论立场。在近年发表的著作中，他对当代一些主要的伦理学理论的合理性表示怀疑，认为这些理论没有令人信服地表现出我们实际经验的伦理现象的根本特征。他在著名的《伦理学与哲学的局限》(1985)一书中进而提出，哲学实际上只能破坏人们从其传统文化中继承的唯一道德知识，而不能产生新的道德知识。简言之，伦理学仅当它在哲学上尚蒙昧时才是客观性的。
作者简介
据剑桥大学出版社1983年英文版译出:书名原文:Utilitarianism:For and against:本书收有斯马特《一种功利主义伦理学体系概述》和威廉斯《功利主义批判》两篇文献。
发布书评
精彩书评 (总计1条)
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很难很难买到。书本身很好，两个人各说一半。斯马特和威廉斯各说一半。我个人赞同前者，尽管后者从学术声望上而言要知名得多。
精彩短评 (总计15条)
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译德很差
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@比卡超 bw的我只记得那个negative responsibility了。。。 -
强烈建议重印 -
很难很难买到。书本身很好，两个人各说一半。斯马特和威廉斯各说一半。我个人赞同前者，尽管后者从学术声望上而言要知名得多。 -
从正反两方面看功利主义，一本不错的论文 -
J. J. C. Smart wrote in his work An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, “We shall use ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ to appraise choices on account of their actual success in promoting the general happiness…” (Smart, p. 322) We can conclude that he thinks that an action is morally right if that action increases the total happiness; wrong if that action decreases the total happiness. I will offer objections. In this paper, I am going to talk about the quantity and quality of happiness, and describe what absurd situation may Smart’s utility theory lead us without having other intrinsically valuable thing except for happiness. Finally I will argue happiness is merely an emotion; and freedom has intrinsic value.
Smart divided Utilitarianism into three categories (p. 314). The first one is Bentham’s theory, which focuses solely on quantity of happiness. The second one is Moore’s theory, which thinks certain states of mind also have intrinsic value, whether they bring happiness or not. The third one is Mill’s theory, which distinguishes qualities of different happiness. Smart critics Moore’s theory and does not think some states of mind have intrinsic value. I disagree with him. If we assume certain states of mind or any other thing does not have intrinsic good, we are going to do something that we can hardly think those are morally right based on utilitarian theory.
Happiness is about quality and quantity. If we can calculate happiness, we can also convert quality into quantity. For example, writing a poem gives you 5 units of happiness; watching TV for a while also gives you 5 units of happiness. However, the quality is different; let us assume they have different coefficients A and B. Then it turns out to be, A×5 ＆ B×5, if writing a poem has higher quality, then A is bigger than B, we should write a poem instead of watching TV.
Under the presupposition that no other things except happiness itself have intrinsic value, we actually can convert all happiness into numbers no matter what are their qualities. Imagine a situation like that: I put a man into Colosseum, fight a beast, put the live show on Internet and tell everyone this is from a film. The man dead at last, he has no friends or relatives, no one will be sad. The coefficient of death is high, and quantity of happiness is negative; the coefficient of each audience is low, since watching a man fighting beasts does not have so much quality I assumed, the quantity of happiness is positive, however, there are millions of people watched it and received happiness. According to the principle of Smart, when the happiness gained by audiences is larger than the happiness loss by that man, force a man fight a beast is morally right. We can hardly agree with this. So we can say that there is something more than happiness which has intrinsic value.
People may say that put a man into Colosseum fight a beast decrease the total happiness in the long run, because it will influence the whole circumstances of society. My reply is that what if it will not? I told people this is not real; then, it will not corrupt morality of the society. And the numbers of audiences who receives happiness is too large. We cannot deny the possibilities that eventually the total happiness increased.
When we sacrifice one—without corrupting morality or some deep devices of the society—in order to increase the total happiness of a certain group, something absurd can take place. Happiness is an emotion, thus it has strong subjectivity—the standard of happiness for each sentient being changes hugely. Our perceptual system, preferences, taste and experiences influence happiness we gain or loss. What’s more, when a man is biologically or mentally abnormal—like a man with pedophilia—he can gain huge happiness from something we think harms the personal liberty, we can hardly think his action is right.
Let’s think of another example, a man has a strange hobby that he loves entering people’s house without permissions, he does this and it gains a huge happiness. He gets in the house without breaking anything—he will find an unlocked window—and he can make sure there is nobody in the house. In short words, his action made the total happiness increases. I do not think his action is right, because he violates property rights. And property rights are derived from the liberty of each individual.
I want to argue now that happiness is not the only thing has intrinsic value. Smart describes happiness like this, “For a man to be happy he must, as a minimal condition, be fairly contented and moderately enjoying himself for much of the time… a long-term concept…” (p. 318) We can conclude that happiness does not equal to the ultimate desirable thing we want. When I introspect, I know I desire personal freedom more than enjoyment in the long run. I can bear unhappiness rather than losing personal freedom. People may say that I weigh personal freedom more, then, I am actually enjoying myself with that preference. My reply is that Smart wrote it is absurd to call a man who is in pain ‘happy’ (p. 318). People who said that actually broaden the definition for happiness, thus it is easy to become a tautology. When you define happiness as everything we ultimately desire in premise, and since only what we ultimately desire has the intrinsic value, then, of course there is only happiness has intrinsic value. Then we can actually call a man who is in pain ‘happy’, that’s not what Smart means I believe.
Freedom does have intrinsic value; think of an example, a book named A Brave New World written by Aldous Huxley, describes a totalitarian society that humans are biologically changed. In this society, no freedom at all, however everyone is happy. (Huxley) Because as I said before that our perceptual system and preferences influence happiness we gain or loss. Then, if our perceptual system and preferences controlled by rulers with high technology, they can make us happy without any freedom. It shares similarities with the electrode operator example. Smart writes that the reason he is hesitate to call the electrode operator ‘happy’ because happiness includes a certain state we are right now (p. 317). I do not think Smart make it clear at this point. When we are going to be biologically changed, the total happiness for us in the long run will actually increase a huge amount. But we refuse that changed is not because of happiness, it is because we desire freedom more than just being happy and enjoying ourselves. Freedom, as a thing has intrinsic value, is a better standard to judge the action than the concept of happiness. It is more objective.
I have considered several absurd situations that Smart’s utility theory can lead us to and I argue that happiness is not a good standard when we try to judge the intrinsic value. Finally I tried to prove that freedom has intrinsic value and we should act in accord with it.
Reference:
1. Huxley, Aldous. Brave New World,. New York: Harper & Bros., 1946. Print.
去年写的，算是我人生中第一篇哲学paper，有些不满意的地方，懒得改了，趁着今天重读斯玛特，发上来玩玩。
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收录对功利主义赞成与批判论文各一篇，个人稍倾后者，但尚未吃透。 -
關於utilitarianism的著名論辯。讀了前言，導師說這本翻譯不好，以後我找原文讀。 -
这本书真正有价值的地方是Williams的objection。。。 -
提炼一下，斯玛特提到打破规则对自身道德败坏影响的考量的时候我突然笑了，去年写文章的时候想破脑袋，把行为者赋予了一个酒醉的状态，妄图取消打破规则的情况下自身道德败坏的影响。做这个总结是为了为写论文做铺垫。
1. 区别：行为功利主义把道德规则看做经验法则，规则功利主义把道德规则提高到了经验法则之上，成为了行动道德评判的标准。
2. 规则功利主义把行动直接诉诸后果的两种情况：（1）规则矛盾（2）无规则
3. 理想功利主义（G.E. Moore, J. S. Mill）向快乐功利主义的坍塌：质仅仅是量的大小差别，或者是边际功效的递减差别。
4. 规则功利主义向行为功利主义的坍塌：小概率事件的发生
a. 规则功利主义的行为影响论：当小概率事件发生之后，如果打破规则，所造成的影响可能会是（1）社会的（2）自身的，但当这种影响不存在或者小于增益的时候，规则功利主义就会向行为功利主义坍塌。
b. 这种造成的影响如果要在举例中彻底消除的话，还是很难，尽管可以用一个类似与“醉酒”的例子来消除4a2中对自身道德的腐坏。
c. 实际上行为功利主义不用考虑打破规则的影响，因为其计算本身就涵盖了打破规则的影响。而规则功利主义实际上是在说：“影响始终大于益处。”对于这种说法，可以用4b中的特殊例子反驳，不过到了这种地步，实在不难发现规则功利主义只是规则崇拜，因为坍塌现象只需要大于等于一的额外情况发生即可。
5. 行为功利主义与道德规则
a. 在行为功利主义的话语中：道德规则/经验法则/普遍道德意识是同一回事。
b. 普遍道德意识的弱点：由于逻辑混乱可能导致的迷信和实际上的道德堕落。
c. 行为功利主义诉诸行为功利主义诉诸道德规则/经验法则/普遍道德意识的情况：（1）时间限制 （2）涉及自身导致偏见可能性的情境
d. 行为功利主义在实然上的表征由于5c1和5c2，通常是道德规则式的。
e. 所以当一个人常常诉诸道德规则，不能推导出他是一个规则功利主义者。
6. 谴责与表扬是实然上的词语，好或坏是应然上的词语，在行为功利主义的体系里，谴责或表扬与好或坏没有必然联系。
7. 自己补充：规则功利主义小概率事件后如何答复：（1）行为影响论（2）通过提出另一个矛盾的规则如2（1）然后诉诸直接结果，然而这样也会自动导致和行为功利主义的同化，因为两者都诉诸直接结果了。（3）而当小概率事件没有发生，作为经验法则的道德规则也自动最好化了结果。这样一来在7（1）失效的情况下，7（2）和7（3）的结果也是同化，和承认小概率事件导致了坍塌性一致。所以我们可以说，他俩其实是一回事儿！ -
翻译很差 -
看不大懂，特别是威廉斯那篇 -
翻译烂得一笔…… -
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B82-064/4872 -
这书翻得实在太烂，这两天正在看英文本。