神學大全
出版社:碧岳學社／中華道明會
出版日期:2008
ISBN:9789868453609
作者:聖多瑪斯·阿奎那,周克勤
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精彩书评 (总计3条)
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【按语：关于Thomas Aquinas（1225-1274），一直藏在我心中的困惑是曾读到的天主教教宗Leo XIII在1879年的Aeterni Patris（永恒之父）通谕里所讲的一番话：“复兴托马斯黄金般的智慧，把它广泛地传播开去，为着天主教信仰的美好，为了保卫天主教信仰。”（Livingston，《现代基督教思想》，何光沪译，四川人民出版社1992年版，第751页）在这道谕令以及随后的行动中，阿奎那的神学和著作被确立为天主教会的思想基础。13世纪的那位“天使博士（指阿奎那）”具有什么样的魔力，竟然使得19世纪末以来的、早已置身现代世界的天主教会如此虔诚地转向阿奎那以寻求思想支援？然而，对《神学大全》的尝试性的阅读却并没有很好地缓解我的困惑。《神学大全》诚然是广博、精微而清晰的，但对我个人而言，却也具有一种窒息的气味：那是神圣者莅临（启示）具有的窒息，是人的理性暂被弃置的窒息。然而，人的理性言说如何能够揭开神圣者的帷幕而不是一种僭越，超越了理性依据的启示又在何种范围内是可靠的？十字军东征（1096-1291）使得基督教世界与伊斯兰世界处于剧烈的冲突之中。然而这巨大的冲突非但没有使得阿奎那意识到“他者”的存在，相反在Aquinas对Trinity(三位一体)的诠释中，甚至奥古斯丁那里具有的人的踌躇、犹豫和不确定性也都消失殆尽了。在这种意义上讲，或许Aquinas的思想是僵化的，哪怕是一种神圣的僵化。有时候我想，假如我所信仰的确实是确凿无疑的真理并与Aquinas所信相同的话，那么Aquinas不是恰好把个人喃喃自语中所祈祷的一切都变成了明晰的真理了么，还有什么可以抱怨的？但是，个人的、隐秘的、动人的祈祷或许并不必然意味着认肯那么多命题式的真理；如果将整部《神学大全》理解为本质上的祈祷之语，则这对于自然之人的心灵是不堪承受的理性负担。Aquinas近乎无缝地融贯了Aristotle的潜能-实现理论、Plato的理念-分有理论和教父思想，为天主教神学提供了一个最精致庞大的体系。第一册中对上帝存在的论证、对上帝本质的分析显示，因果性（causality）在Aquinas的整个体系中居于多么核心的位置，而这种Causality与康德的那种形式的causality区别巨大，Aquinas的Causality意味着某种agency的观念。 在德国Münster大学获得哲学博士学位的周克勤神父（1925-2007）从1973年起，耗费30余年，邀约和主持了Summa Theologiae的中文全译，到2008年由中华道明会和碧岳书社出版。其间周克勤神父青丝变白发，于2007年辞世归主，未及见到《神学大全》的出版，极为遗憾。《神学大全》中译本超过650万字，正文分为17册。翻译主要从拉丁文，参考德法西意英等多种语言，质量极优。其中，第一册论三位一体、第三册论人和灵魂、第四/五册论德性和罪、第六册论法律、第十三/十四册论道成肉身我个人尤为关切。《神学大全》遵循特定的写作方式，按照论题和节来划分。每个论题（Question）分为若干节（Articles），每一节分成四个部分：质疑（Ad primum sic proceditur /Objection1…：举出数个与作者论点相反的对立意见或异议)；反之(Sed conta /On the contrary：根据作者托马斯的观点引经据典的言论); 正解(Respondeo dicendum quod /I answer that…：阐述托马斯自己的主张和分析); 释疑(Ad primum ergo dicendum /Reply obj.1…/：逐条回应‘质疑’列举的反对意见) 。全书共有613个论题，3093节。写作不是以一种尝试的、探索性的方式展开；而是以一种提供真理教诲的方式展开。这类似于宣道：作者经过了艰苦卓越的努力攀登了顶峰之后，回首向后学者予以权威性的教导。所以阿奎那在前言中以启蒙者的口吻说：“天主教真理的教师，不独应该教导学习有成者，而且也有责任启蒙初学者。...我们在这部著作（《神学大全》）中所设定的目标，是采用宜于初学者的教学方式，来讲授属于基督宗教的种种真理。”（多玛斯·阿奎那：《神学大全》第一册《论天主一体三位》前言，周克勤等译，中华道明会、碧岳学社出版社2008年版，第1页，下同）无论如何，这种写作方式意味着作者必须具有惊人的学识、精细入微的辨析力和卓越的统御力，而这恰恰是Aquinas所胜任的。这也意味着阅读《神学大全》是一件艰难的工作，所论之处都是繁杂的、按部就班的辨析，而其分量则是令人绝望的无穷无尽。阅读对参了CCEL的英译本。这里提供了第一册的摘要。】1.论圣道的性质和范围（The nature and Extent of sacred Doctrine）1.1 “为了人的得救，需要把某些超越人理性的事物，藉由天主的启示而揭示于人。而且，有关天主的事物，即使是那些人的理性所能探讨的，人亦需要天主的启示来教导。…理性所研究出来的有关天主的真理，只要少数人经过长时间才能获得，而且掺杂有许多错误。…所以，除了以理性所研究的哲学学科之外，还需要有一种基于启示的教学或圣道。”【3-4】“同样的事物，哲学学科根据其为自然理性之光所能认知的一面来研讨它们，而另一学问则根据其为天主启示之光所认知的一面来研讨它们。属于圣道的神学，与被列为哲学之部分的神学，二者不属于同类。”【4】1.2-5 圣道是一门学问（scientia），“依赖或建基于由天主所启示给自己的原理，”【5】“主要讨论天主，其讨论受造物，是因为它们与天主有关系，以天主为根源和目的。”【6】兼容理论和实践，但理论部分更为关键，“胜过其他一切理论和实践的学问。…这一学问所讨论的主要事物的崇高超过人的理性，而其它的学问却只讨论属于人的理性之下的事物。”【9】“它从其它学问有所领受，不是像从更高的学问一样，而是把它们当作属下和婢女而加以利用。”【10】1.6-8 因为观察最高原因者被称为有智慧者，而“圣道正是专门在天主是最高原因的固定观点下，来讨论天主…因此圣道最有资格被称为智慧。”【11】启示高于理性，圣道的本分是去判断其它学问：“在其它的学问中，不论有什么与此一圣道或学问的真理不相符合，都被判为错误。”【12】天主就是这一学问的研究对象，诸如救赎、基督、教会等都是根据与天主的关系而来。圣道也是论证性的，“圣道之论证，不是为了证明自己的原理，即信德的条文，而是由原理出发，来显示另一些事物（this doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on to prove something else）。…根据权威来论证，属于此一圣道的固有性质，因为此一圣道的原理来自启示，如此则应该相信那些蒙受启示者的权威。”【15-16】圣道也利用理性来澄清，因此这里便有了谈及启示或恩典与理性的关联的名言：“恩宠并不毁灭本性，而是使本性更为完善，所以自然理性应该为信德服务，就如意志的自然倾向应该为爱德服务一样（grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity）。”【16】但对于圣道来说，理性的权威是外来的和盖然的，而圣经的权威则是内在的和必然的（sacred doctrine makes use of these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof）。1.9-10 “因为我们的一切知识都是由感觉开始（it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense），”【17】圣经适宜地使用有形事物的隐喻（metaphora, metaphor）来传授天主的及神性的事物。而圣经中的同一个字往往具有多种意义：本义和精神的意义，后者又分三种：象征的（Allegorical），伦理的（moral）和奥秘的（Anagogical）。2．论天主是否存在（the existence of God）2.1 “天主存在”是不是自明的（self-evident）。“所谓自明的事物，就是那些只要知道了词义，立刻就知道的事物。”【23】Aquinas区分了事物本身的自明和事物针对我们的自明：“一个命题是自明的，这是因为它的述词已经被包含在主词之理或本质里。”【24】但就人而言，就还涉及到需要明了主词和述词的意义。因此“天主存在”这个命题本身是自明的，但因为我们不知道“天主是什么”或天主的本质，因而并非自明的。这里Aquinas否定了Anselmus有关上帝存在的本体论论证：“那无法设想有比之更伟大的存在者”的意义并不清楚；在理智中的存在不表明实际存在。【鉴于Aquinas在此没有对“存在”给出说明，Aquinas这里的分析并不有力量，但按照Aquinas接受的Plato或Aristotle的方式来理解“存在”，Anselmus的论证本身是强有力的。】这里23页提到“如果真理不存在的话，那么‘真理不存在’（这个命题）就是真的”这样一个悖论式推理，后面16.7处有详解。2.2 Aquinas区分了“知其所以然（propter quid/A priori，藉由原因到效果/先天的）”和“知其然（quia/a posteriori，藉由效果到原因/后天的）”两种证明。每一效果都依赖其原因，而有些效果比原因对我们更为明显，“‘天主存在’对我们虽不是自明的，但可以藉由我们所知道的祂的效果来加以证明。”【26】因此，Aquinas肯定了对上帝存在的a posteriori证明。【因果关系具有最核心的位置】2.3 Aquinas为上帝存在提供了“五路（five ways）”论证：1.由运动（motion）的存在推论到第一推动者（the first mover）。这里特别重要的是阿奎那反对推衍无限（infinity）的论证：“我们不能无限地如此推延下去；因为如此无限地推延下去，就没有第一个推动者，因此亦不会有其它推动者，因为如果第二个推动者不被第一个推动者所推动，则本身亦不会推动。…所以必须终结到某第一个推动者（But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover）。”【28】这似乎是个反证法的运用。2.由成因（causa efficiens/efficient cause, 这个概念需要琢磨）推导到第一成因; 3. 由可能存在推导到必然存在。4.万物中的等级次序的存在推导出最高的存在；5.万物治理中的目的推导出万物的治理者。3. 论天主的单纯性（of the simplicity of God）在开始讨论天主的存在方式和本质时，Aquinas强调了否定神学的方法：“对于天主，我们不可能知道祂是什么，而只能知道祂不是什么；所以，我们没有办法讨论天主如何存在，而只能讨论祂如何不存在（because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather how He is not）。”【32】3.1-3 天主不是形体（corpus）：非被推动、非潜能、最高贵的。“人是依照天主的肖像，是根据理智和理性，而二者都不是形体物。”【35】“天主因自己的本质而为形式，并不是由质料和形式组合而成的。…那个不能由质料所接受，而是本原或因本质自立存在(per se subsistens)的形式，就因为它不可能被接受在一个主体内而个体化，而这样的形式正是天主。”【37】“天主与祂的本质或本性是同一的。…在那些不是由形式和质料所组合而成的物中，他们的个体化不是来自个体质料，即不是来自this质料，而是形式本身已是个体。所以，在他们中，形式应该是自立存在的主体或基质。是以在他们中，基体（suppositum）与本质并无不同。”【38-39】3.4 天主内本质与存在是一回事。因为如果不是一回事，则其存在是由外因形成，而天主是自己存在的原因；而且“存在就是一切形式或本性的实现，”【41】而天主就是实现而非潜能。这里Aquinas指出，拉丁词esse (to be)有两种含义：存在之现实或命题的连接词。在第一种意义上我们不知道天主的本质或存在；在第二种意义上我们知道Deus est这个命题是真的，我们是从效果的意义上讲的。3.5节说天主不属于某一类（genus）的种(species)的时候，有这么一句话：“那‘构成种的差别’或‘种差’之所从出者，与那‘类’之所从出者，二者之间的关系，相当于现实与潜能的关系（Now that from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality）。”【43】这里准确地说，在species-genus关系与potentiality-actuality/form-matter关系之间不好随意类比。Being/ens不是一个类，因为没有种差。【43】3.6-8 天主没有依附体或偶性（accidents）：accidents涉及潜能-实现；天主是自己的存在，而存在本身无accidents；非被形成，而accidents是形成的。 天主是完全单纯的，也不会进入其它物的组合之中。这里Aquinas批评了一系列谬见，譬如天主是世界的灵魂的看法。4. 论天主的完美（the perfection of God）“任何一个东西，基于它是完美的或成全的，而说它是美善的或善的。”【51，perfection是ens与goodness之间的过渡概念】4.1-2 天主是第一成因，作为第一Agens（主动者）, 处于最大的现实中，是最完美的。“说一件东西是完美的，系根据它是处于现实中，因为所谓完美的，就是说一件东西针对它应有的完美一无所缺（a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection）。”【52】这里说“有或存在本身是万物中最完美的”【53，可真是不知道怎么理解存在，Aquinas似乎总是在含混！！！】在天主内有万物的一切完美：效果内的任何完美，在成因内都应该有；天主是per se subsistens的存在本身，不缺乏任何的完美。4.3 万物都按照分有的方式与天主相似，这里遵循某种类比（analogia）。【显然的柏拉图理论】5. 概论善（of goodness/bonum in general）5.1-2 “善与有或物（ens/being）在实质上是同一的，只是在理解或观念上有区别。…善之理或本质在于一物是值得欲求的。…物之所以是值得欲求的，是根据该物之圆满完成或完美。…而物之为完美，即在于物之为现实。”【60】在观念上，有或物先于善，“首先进入理智之领悟的是有或物。”【62，这种区分只对于人或有限理智才有意义吧？】5.3 “一切的有或物（ens）,以其为有或物而言，都是善的。因为一切的有或物，以其为有或物而言，都是处于现实中的，都有某种程度的完美。”【65】第一质料因指向善的适合性而分有一些善。5.4 物之善是就其完美而言，而完美则是就其形式、以及形式的模式、种和秩序而言的。可把善分为virtuous, useful和Pleasant三种，是一种延展的用法。6. 论天主之善（the goodness of God）6.1-4 善特别适用于天主，“天主是绝对的或全面的至善。…善之归于天主，是因为所有被欲望之完美，均由天主、有如是由第一原因涌出。”【75】只有天主是因自己的本质而是善的，“每一物都是因天主之善性而被称为是善的，这是以天主之善性为所有善性之第一模型、形成和final cause或根本。”【80】7. 论天主的无限性（The infinity of God）7.1-2 “一物之被称为是无限的，就是因为它不是有限的或不受限制的。…归于质料的无限或无限制是有不完美者的性质，因为那是等于没有形式的质料。…没有受到质料限定的形式方面的无限，是有完美者的性质。万物之最普遍和彻底的形式根源，就是有或存在本身（being）。…天主是无限的、及完美的。”【82-3】“天主之外，一物可能相对地（或就某方面而言）是无限的，但不可能绝对地（或就全面或整体而言）是无限的。…就如一块木头，依木头的形式本来就是有限的，可是因为这块木头有潜能成为无限或无数种不同的形状，也是相对地无限的。”【84】质料是相对于形式的潜能，是绝对地有限的，而只是相对无限的。天使因其接受存在，因此也不是绝对无限的。【84】7.3-4 区分本质的无限和infinity in magnitude。“有没有受造物在宏大方面或就大小来说是无限的？…一个自然形体物或形体，不可能是现实或实际无限的，因为凡是自然形体物都有一个被限定的或固定的本体或自立体形式（it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite. For every natural body has some determined substantial form）。”【86】“现实的无限多，即使是偶然的，也是不可能的。但是潜能中的无限多确实可能的。…正如在一个连续体的分割中，有潜能的无限（无限次分割的可能性），因为所涉及的是质料。同理，在数目之多的增加中，亦有潜能的无限（无限次增加的可能性）。”【90，这一题的讨论很重要，但似乎可以说遗留了可能的问题：时间和空间是否无限呢？自然，matter-form的区分部分地解决了问题，因为时空可以具有类似于非天主的纯形式的位置，不是绝对无限的。对比Locke在《人类理解论》中的论述。】8. 论天主临在于万物内（the existence of God in things）8.1 “天主在万物内…有如行动者或工作者临止于其所做之物。”【92】天主之在万物内，有如是包容或统括万物者。天主处处都在，给予存在和承载的能力。天主藉能力（万物属于祂的能力之下）、莅临（万物暴露在其前）和本体（是万物存在的原因）存在于万物内。在per se上，处处都在是天主独有的。9. 论天主的不变性（the immutability of God）天主是纯现实，完全不变的。且只有天主是绝对不变的。就是那些没有形体的自立体或形式，虽就其本身内没有变为不存在的能力或潜能，但仍有两种可变性：追求目的的能力而言，以及针对地方（place）而言。10. 论天主的永恒性（the eternity of God）Aquinas的时间概念类同Aristotle“时间之理或本质在于数算变动或运动中的先后（the numbering of movement by "before" and "after"）。”【109】我们通过时间（随变动性而来）认知永恒（随不变性而来），其有两个特点：永恒者是无极限的，没有开始和终了；也没有接续，是完整而同时地存在的（eternity has no succession, being simultaneously whole）。真正而确实的永恒性，只有在天主内才有。“一些东西由于由天主接受了不变性，所以也据以分有天主的永恒性。”【113】 “永恒是恒常或固定存在的度量，而时间却是变动或运动的度量。”【116】Aquinas还在永恒与时间之间插入了一个永常（aeviternity），类似于精神自立体的度量。11. 论天主的唯一性（the Unity of God）天主是唯一的，三个理由：单纯性；无限完美性；世界的一致性需要由同一个东西来安排次序。这里Aquinas还说天主是supremely one,而point和one则不是，因为后者需要主体。【133，让人想起Leibiniz的三点：形而上学的、数学的、物理的points】12. 论我们怎样认知天主（On how God is known by us）12.1“每一物之能被认知，系根据它是在现实中，而天主是纯现实，未掺杂任何潜能，所以就天主本身而言，祂是最能被认知的。…获享真福者看见天主的本质或本体。”【136】“天主既是理智能力指创作者，又能为理智所看见，这是很明显的事。…为了看见天主的本质，在看见的能力方面，需要某种相似或像，就是需要荣光或荣福之光(light of glory)来加强理智以看见天主。…不过，却不能藉某种受造的像而看见天主的本质或本体，宛如这像能呈现出天主的本质或本体自己实际怎样。”【138-9】12.3-6不可能用感官能力看见天主，也“不可能有受造物的理智用自己的自然禀赋看见天主的本质或本体。”【143】物的存在有多种形态：形体物；没有形体的自立体；自立存在即天主。认识形体物对人是自然的，而“认知自立存在本身，只有对天主的理智来说是自然的，却超越所有受造理性的自然能力。…除非天主藉自己的恩宠，把自己与受造的理智联系起来，使理智可以理解，受造的理智便不能看见天主的本质或本体。”【144】“必须加给理智一种超越其本性的配备，以便把它提升到这么高的境界。…受造的理智的自然能力既不足以看见天主的本质或本体，那么就必须用天主的恩宠来增强它的理解能力。我们称这种理解能力的增强为理智的接受光照；就如那可理解者或被理解者被称为光或发光者一样（Now this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect, as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light of illumination）。”【146】“分受福容之光较多的理智，看天主就看得更完全。而有更大爱德的，就分受更多的福容之光。”【148】12.7-10 纵然如此，对任何受造的理智来说，洞见天主都是不可能的。“天主的现实或存在是无限的。…没有任何受造的理智能够无限地认知天主。因为受造的理智之较为完全地或较不完全地认知天主，是基于它承受了较大的或较小的荣光或荣福之光。”【151】受造的理智也不能认知天主所做的或所能做的一切。“在圣言（the Word）中所看见的事物，不是一个一个接连地，而是同时一齐看见的。…不是藉其各自的像去看每一事物，而是藉天主的同一本质去看一切。”【158】12.11-12 “单单的人，除非离开这个有死的今生，便不可能看见天主的本质或本体。”【160】藉着自然理性不能看见天主的本质或本体，可是自然理性“是天主的效果，我们能够由它们的引导而知道天主是否存在，以及知道基于天主是万物的第一原因并且超越所有效果，而必须归于祂的一切。”【163】“认知天主的本质或本体，既是藉着恩宠，所以只有善人才有；可是，以自然理性认知天主，却是善人和恶人都能做到的。”【163】启示高于理性，“我们藉着恩宠会获得比藉着自然理性对天主更完全的认知。”【164】13. 论天主的名称（the names of God）13.1-3 “语言是理解之内容或观念的记号，而观念是事物的像。语言是经由理智的观念而表达事物的。因此，凡是我们用理智所能认知的，我们就能够给它一个名称。…在今生我们不能看见天主的本质或本体；可是我们能够根据本原或因果的关系，依卓越及隔离或剔除的方式，而由受造物去认知天主。所以，我们可以由受造物方面给天主命名。当然这样的名称不是指称天主本身，表达天主的本质或本体实际上是怎样的。”【167-8】有一些绝对的和肯定说法的名称，如“美善的、”“有智慧的”，“这样的名称确实是表示天主的本体，确实是称述天主的本体，只是她们并不足以表现天主。”【171】“我们却认知在受造物的完美中所表现出的天主的本质或本体。”【172】这里，在分有的意义上，是按照本义的方式来陈述天主。13.4-7 称呼天主的名称不是同义的（synonymous）。“名称表达的意义是对名称所表达的实物的领悟或理念。…加给天主的名称虽然都表示同一个实物，但因为它们是在许多不同观念之下表示同一事物，所以它们并不是同义的。”【176】而有的名称通用于天主和受造物，则“是依类比，也就是说是依比例或关系。”【179】“在名称所表示的实物方面来说，它们是首先指称天主，然后才指称受造物，因为这些完美是由天主输入受造物的。不过，在命名方面，我们是先把这些名称加给受造物，因为我们是先认知受造物。”【183】“主”在天主有隶属于自己的受造物一起拿，祂不曾是“主”，因此，含有与受造物之关系的天主的称呼，是从时间性的角度来称呼的。13.8-12 Deus/God这个词原意是to care of and cherish all things,或“燃烧”。就起源而言，是一个作为或行为的名称。但“由这个作为或行动而起的‘天主’这个名称，却是用来表示天主之性体的（divine nature）。”【190】“我们(对天主)的认知只是藉由卓越(excellence)、因果和否定的方式。”【190】 “Qui est(那存在者)这个名称，是最适用于天主的特有名称。”【199】：表示存在本身；具有普遍性；表明是没有过去和未来的。还有一个更专有的即Tetragrammaton,YHWH,“耶和华”。“关于天主能形成真实的肯定命题。…在任何一个真实的肯定命题里，主词与述词所表示的，就实物而言大致是同一个，而在思想或观念方面则是不同的多个。”【202】14. 论天主的知识（of God’s knowledge）在讨论完天主的本体之种种后，进而讨论属于天主的动作（operation），这涉及到认知和意愿。14.1-8 “天主既然是位于非物质性的极点，所以祂有最高等级的认知。”【206】人按对象不同而有不同认知：“就其认知原理而言，他有intelligentia, 就其认知（根据原理的）结论而言，他有Knowledge；就其认知最高原因而言，他有智慧；就其认知为人行事而言，他有prudence。而天主却是用一个单纯的认知动作认知这一切。”【206】天主理解和洞察（comprehend）自己。“天主的理解就是天主的本体。”【212】天主也必定认知有别于自己之物。“天主在自己内能以特殊的（proper）认知而认知一切。”【218】天主的知识没有任何推理过程，“天主是在自己内，有如在原因内，看见自己的效果，所以祂的认知不是推论的。”【221】而且“天主的知识，是万物的原因。因为天主的知识与一切受造物的关系，就如艺术家与艺术品的关系一样。”【222】“自然界之物，是位于天主的知识和我们的知识之中间；因为我们是由自然物获得知识，而天主却藉着自己的知识而是这些自然物的原因。”【223】14.9-16 “凡是受造物所能做的、或想的、或说的一切，连天主自己所能做的一切，天主统统都知道，即使他们实际尚未存在。按此而可以说，即使对非物或非存在物，天主也有知识。”【224】天主是藉着善而认知恶，因为“恶的本质就是善的缺乏。”【227】天主也认知singular things，“由于天主之主动能力不仅及于为普遍性之根由的形式，而且也即于质料或物质，所以天主的认知也必然及于藉质料或物质而个体化的个别物。”【229】有绝对的无限和相对的无限，前者属于天主，后者涉及无限大、无限长等，而天主认知无限。“天主也是以观看的知识认知无限，因为天主洞悉心中的一切思想和情感，而这些可以无限地增多，因为有理性的受造物将无穷尽地存在下去。”【232】天主的知识是物的度量，而无限的量等“都是由特定的和有限制的存在，因为他们的存在都是被局限于某些特定的本性。”【233】天主知道未来的偶有事物；天主的知识是完全不可改变的。15. 论理念（of ideas）“天主的灵智或理智内有理念。…理念的意义，就是物之存在于自己本身以外的形式（form of things, existing apart from the things themselves）。一物之存在于自己本身以外的形式，能有两种作用；或者是作为此形式之物的模型，或者是作为认知该物的原理或根本。”【246】“宇宙之秩序正是天主所意图的，并非偶然地来自先后相继的主动原因。…天主必定有宇宙秩序之理念。”【248-9】16. 论真理（of truth）16.1 “‘真’指的是理智之所向者。…认知是根据被认知者存在于认知者内，而嗜欲则是根据欲求者倾向于被欲求者。因此，嗜欲的重点，即善，是在被欲求之事物内；而认知的终点，即真，则是在理智内（the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, namely true, is in the intellect itself）。”【254】“由于真之在理智内，是因为理智与被理解的事物相符合，所以真之理或性质必然是由理智而延伸至被理解的事物，使被理解的事物也因为与理智有某种关联而称为真的（since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect）。…真理主要的是在理智内；次要地才是在事物内，这是根据事物与其原理或根本，即理智的关系（truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle.）。”【254-5，Aquinas的真理与其唯灵论密切相关，天主-天主的认识-事物-人的理智，在这样的环节中认识真理】真理定义就是理智与事实之间的相符，而认知这种相符，却是感官绝对无法做到的，“因为视觉虽然有被看到之物的像或相似，却无法认知被看到之物和自己对该物所觉察者之间的关系。而理智却能够认知其本身与被理解之物的相符。…理智是藉着综合和分析做到此点的。”【257】真可以与物互换。从观念上讲，“真是先于善的”【260】：存在者最先，而真比善更接近存在者；认知先于欲求。“真理在理智内，是根据理智领悟物一如其实际存在。…天主就是至高的和第一真理本身。”【261-2】只有在天主的理智内，真理才有永恒性。“天主理智的真理是不变的，而我们理智的真理却是可变的。”【268】17. 论虚假（of falsity）“一物能是因与自己所依赖的理智之本然关系，绝对的称为假；因与其他理智的偶然关系，只能相对地称为假。”【271】“在依赖天主理智的事物中，不可能如此因与天主理智之关系而有虚假，因为在事物内所有的一切，都是来自天主的安排。只有在自主的主动者内才会有例外，他们有能力违反天主理智的安排，而这也正构成足额，圣经上也因此称罪恶本身为‘虚假和谎言’。”【271】事物也因与我们理智的偶然关系而称为假的。“不应该在感官内寻找虚假，除非是依真理在感官内的方式。”【273】18. 论天主的生命（the life of God）“当动物开始自己推动自己或自动时，我们就说它有最初的生活或生命。…真正有生命者，就是那些以某种行动来推动自己者。…凡是主动促使自己行动或活动者，就称为是有生命的。”【281】Life这个词取自自动这种现象，指的却是“一个依其天性应会自动或者促使或启动自己从事各种活动的实体或自立体。依此，生活无非就是在此种天性中的有或存在，而生命则是抽象的方式来表示此点。”【284】“生命依其本义，是以极致的方式存在于天主内。”【285】“凡是作为被理解者而存在于天主内者，就是天主的生活或生命本身。因此，既然为天主所创造的一切，都是作为被理解者而存在于天主内，所以凡是在天主内的，都是天主的生命本身（Hence whatever is in God as understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself）。”【289，难得有点泛神论色彩】19. 论天主的意志（the will of God）19.1-2 “任何一物，对于自己的本性或自然形式，都有这样的关系：即几时没有自己的形式，就趋向于它；几时享有这形式，就息止于它。…如此则在天主内也必然有意志，因为在祂内有理智。而且就如祂的理解就是祂的存在，同样祂的愿欲也是如此。”【292】天主的意志常常有善作为对象，“天主之意志的对象就是自己的美善，而祂的美善就是祂的本质。”【293】天主不但愿欲自己，而且也愿欲有别于自己之物，“促使自己尽可能地把自己特有的善分施给其他的物。…把自己本身所有的善尽可能地通传给其他的物，这属于意志的本质。而这更是首要属于天主的意志。”【294】19.3 有绝对必然的和by supposition的必然两种情况。“一物被判定是绝对必然的，是依据词与词之关系：因为谓词或述词已被包括在主词之定义内，例如人是动物。…假定下的必然：即假定他作者，那么，当他坐着的时候，他坐着就是必然的。”【297】“天主愿欲某物或有所愿欲是必然的；但并不是针对天主所愿欲的一切物都是如此。…天主是必然愿欲有自己的美善。…天主之愿欲有别于自己之物，并不是绝对必然的。”【297】“并非凡是天主所愿欲这，也均是必然愿欲。”【298】19.4-5 “天主的意志是事物的原因，天主是藉着意志行事或动作，不是像有些人所想的那样，是出于本性的必然。…凡是藉着本性动作者，都是受到限定的存在。所以，既然天主的存在不受任何限定，而是在其本身内统括全部存在的完美，那么祂不可能是藉本性之必然性而动作。”【300】“而天主的意志本身绝无任何原因。”【302】19.6-7“天主的意志必然常常达成。…一物虽然可能缺欠或不符合某种特殊形式，但没有什么可能缺欠或不符合普遍形式。…因为可能有事物发生，而超出或逾越某一特殊主动原因的秩序，但不可能超出包括一切特殊原因的普遍原因的秩序。”【304】“天主的意志既然是万物的普遍原因，那么天主的意志绝不可能不获致自己的效果。…譬如：犯罪之人，依其自行犯罪而言，脱离了天主的意志，但当他受到天主正义的惩罚时，却又落回天主意志的秩序之内。”【305】这里Aquinas区分了先导意愿（antecedent will，一般意愿）和后继意愿（consequently wills，考虑了一切特殊情况，绝对的）。【306】“天主的意志是完全不可改变的。不过，改变意志是一回事，愿欲某些事物的改变却是另一回事。…天主的意志虽是第一和普遍的原因，但却不排除有能力产生某些效果的中间原因。”【308】19.8-9 “天主的意志加给某些他所愿欲之事物必然性，但不是加给一切祂所愿欲之事。…而为了使万物中有构成宇宙完整的秩序，天主愿欲一部分事物必然地发生，而另一部分事物偶然地发生。…天主所愿欲的效果之所以是偶然地产生，不是因为它们的近因或第二原因是偶然的；而是因为天主愿欲它们偶然地产生，并因此为它们准备了偶然的原因。”【311】“罪过之恶由于剥夺或破坏趋向天主之善的秩序，天主绝不愿欲。而自然缺陷之恶或惩罚之恶，却是天主所愿欲的，因为他愿欲这种恶所伴随的善。”【313】19.10-12 “天主是必然的愿欲自己的美善，而祂之愿欲其他的事物，却是非出自必然；所以对于这些祂不是必然愿欲之事物，祂有自由意志或自由抉择。”【315】天主的意志还有五项表征（expression）：禁止、命令、劝谕、动作和容许。“意志的这类表征，是指我们习惯用以显示我们愿意什么的那些事物。”【318】20. 论天主之爱（God’s love）“必须肯定在天主内有爱。因为意志及任何嗜欲能力的第一个行动就是爱。”【321】不过天主却没有情（passions），“感觉嗜欲之行动，以其具有与之相随的身体之变化而言，称之为情。”【322】而天主是没有形体的。“天主爱一切存在者或万有。因为凡是存在之物，以其存在而言，都是善的；因为任何一物的存在本身都是一种善（God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses）。”【324】“严格说来，天主不是以友谊之爱，而是宛如以欲望之爱，爱没有理性的受造物，也就是说，天主把他们导向有理性的受造物，甚至导向天主自己；但不是好像天主需要他们，而是出于祂自己的仁善和为了我们的好处。”【325】一方面，天主以同一个意志和爱爱万物，另一方面，天主更爱更善之物。21. 论天主的正义和仁慈（Justice and mercy of God）在交换正义和分配正义中，后者可应用于天主。“自然界及意志界所呈现之次序，也显示出天主的正义。…祂按照每一个存在物的地位，把每一物所应得的，分施给他；并依每一物所特有的次序及能力，保存他的自然天性或物性。”【332】正义等意志的德性应归于天主，“但这不是针对人之社会政治方面的行为，而是那些相宜于天主的行为。”【332】正义就是to each one is due what is his own,而due涉及两种秩序：以另一种受造物为归依，或以天主为归依。这样也两方面看待天主的Due：相应于祂的Decentia而完成智慧的设计；“相应于受造物，天主亦有其所欠者或应做者，即是使之获有那以他为归依者或为他所设者。”【333】后者被称为善恶的报应。天主的正义就是真理。“天主的正义在万物中建立了符合自己智慧之理或计划的秩序，而祂的智慧就是祂的法律，所以称这正义为真理，是很适当的。”【335】应该把仁慈（Misericordia）归于天主。天主不像人一样会为了别人的不幸或困苦而感到悲伤，但他会采取行动解除困苦。在天主的每一事捏，必然有仁慈和正义。甚至在受罚中也能看到仁慈与正义。“藉着这些苦痛，他们的一些轻微罪过获得净化，而他们自己也由爱恋地上之物被提升起来而更趋向天主。”【340】22. 论天主的照顾（the providence of God）同时关涉到理智和意志的有providence, predestination等。“天主藉着自己的理智而是万物的原因，因此，祂的每一效果，必然在天主内预先有其理或涉及存在。所以，万物归向目的的秩序，亦必然在天主的理智内预先有其理或涉及存在。而安排万物归向目的的涉及，却正是照顾。”【342】“一切万物，不仅是在普遍的或共同的方面，而且也是在特殊的个体方面，都在天主的照顾之下。”【345】“所谓天主把人交付给人自己，并不是说人不受天主的照顾，而是表示人的活动能力未被先天地限定于一，像自然物一样。…可是自由意志之行为可回溯到天主，有如以天主为原因，所以，凡是由自由意志所发生的，便都属于天主的照顾之下，因为人的照顾包括在天主的照顾之内，就如特殊的原因包含在普遍的原因内一样。”【347】天主直接照顾一切，这却不排除第二原因。【349】“天主的照顾加给某些事物必然性，但不是加给所有的事物。…如果事物中没有各种等级的存在，也就不会有宇宙的完美。因此，造生所有各种等级之存在物，这属于天主的照顾。为此，祂为某些事物准备了必然的原因，使它们必然地发生；而为另一些事物准备了偶然的原因，使它们按照近因之条件而为偶然发生之事物。”【351】23. 论预定（of predestination）“宜于把预定人得救归于天主。”【353】永恒的生命或永生在于享见天主，这个目的是超出受造物本性之比例及能力的。【不知道Adam在未堕落之前是否能有永生？】“因此严格地说，有可能承受永生之理性的受造物，他们就好像是藉由天主的传送，而被引致永生。而这种传送之理或涉及，已预先存在于天主内。…上述传送理性受造物达到永生目的之理或涉及，即称为‘预定’。”【353-4】“天主摒弃某一些人。…安排人获得永生既然是来自天主的照顾，那么容许一些人不克达到这个目的，这也属于天主的照顾。而这就是所谓摒弃或弃绝。”【358】这里涉及到摒弃与自由意志的关系。“摒弃却不是那属于今生者罪过的原因，而只是被天主遗弃之原因。不过，摒弃是将来所施予者，即永罚之原因。可是，罪过确是来自那被摒弃并被恩宠所遗弃之人的自由意志。…虽然某一被天主所摒弃者不能获得恩宠，但他之陷入这个罪或那个罪，却是出于他自己的自由意志。因此他理应负担罪过之责任。”【358，这里的预定论，似乎后来的Calvin也差不多呢！！！】预定涉及拣选（chosen）。“为什么他拣选这些人进入荣光，而摒弃那些人，除了天主之意志外，别无其他理由。”【365】“预定极确定的、决不会错地达到它的效果，但却不加给必然性，即它的效果并非是必然地或不得不然地发生。…预定之安排也是确定的，不过这并不取消意志之自由，预定之效果就是由这意志之自由偶然或非必然产生的。”【366】24. 论生命册（the book of life）25. 论天主的能力（the power of God）天主拥有至高的主动能力。能力、意志和知识作为同一者归于天主。“天主的主动能力必是无限的。”【383】天主是全能的（omni-potent），意思是：“说天主是全能的，是因为他能做‘一切绝对可能的事’…说一件事是绝对可能的或绝对不可能的，是基于字词间之关系：如果述词或谓词与主词之间没有矛盾，就是可能的；如果述词或谓词与主词互不相容，就是绝对不可能的。”【386，这里的全能指的是与逻辑不可能相反的情况】而犯罪是缺陷，天主不能犯罪与其全能不冲突。天主不能使过去发生的事情没有发生。26.论天主的真福（of the divine beatitude）最应该把真福归给天主，其意义就是理智之nature的完善或完美。27. 论天主位格之出发（the procession of the divine persons）这里开始论述天主位格。Procession意思同于起源。这种出发是在天主内的，“应按理智方面之源出与出发，比如可理解之心灵言语，源出于发言者，却仍然存留在发言者之内。天主教信德是如此肯定在天主内有出发。”【405】“在天主内，言的出发，在天主内称为生或生育（The procession of the Word in God is called generation）。”【407】但“在天主内有两种出发，即言之发出，及另一种出发。…言之出发，是根据理智方面的行动。在我们内，有另一种根据意志之行动的出发，即爱的出发。依这种出发，被爱者是在爱者之内… 因此，除了言之出发外，也肯定在天主内有另外一种出发，即爱之出发。”【409-10】“爱之出发不应称为生育。”【411】这可以用理智与意志的区别说明：理智的理解总是藉由像来进行的，而意志却是指向对象的一种倾向。“这样的行动，在有理智的和天主的本性或性体内，只有两种，即理解和愿欲。”【413，Aquinas对三位格的认识与Augustine在《忏悔录》卷13中有关“存在、认识和意志”的类比完全相合，但在Augusitne表示了谦卑之处，Aquinas却径直宣布真理！！！】28. 论天主内的关系（the divine relations）“在天主内，有些关系是实在的。…在天主内之出发既是在同一本性内，那么根据天主内的出发而有的关系，必是实在的关系。”【416】“实际存在于天主内之关系，就其本身而言，与天主的本质或本体显然是同一的；其分别只是在理智的思考方面。”【420】在天主内有四种关系：“生育之本源的关系称为父性；由本源出发者之关系则称为子性。而爱之出发却没有特有的名称。…不过，这种出发之本源的关系可称为嘘出或发出（spiratio），而那出发者之关系则称为出发。”【425】29. 论天主之位格（the divine persons）30. 论天主位置之多数性（the plurality of persons in God）有substantia, subsistentia, suppositum, persona, hypostasis几个词值得注意，而中译者也提供了按语。【427-428】个人印象，在解释persons的时候，Aquinas实际上将Essence放在了更基础的位置上来连通诸persons，但又通过其它的论述抵消essence/essentia的暂时优势位置，消解substance和essence的区分。29.1 “Substance这一类，却是以一种独特的方式有其个体或个别的体。…那些具有理性的自立体，进而以一种更为独特和完美的方式，有自己的特殊和个别，这些自立体有自己行为的主权，不像其他物一样只是被动，而是自己主动（Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars）。”【430】“位格所便是的，是那在整个自然本性中最完美者，即那在理性本性中自立存在者。…用位格这一名称来称述天主是合理的。”【437】“位格这个名称之间表示关系，间接表示本质。”【441】“必须承认在天主内只有三位格。…发出既属于圣父之位格，亦属于圣子之位格，因为它与父性和子性都没有关系的对立。因此，出发就必是属于另一位格，即那称为圣神的位格，祂是以爱的方式出发。所以在天主内只有三位或三位格，即圣父、圣子和圣神。”【446】32. 论对天主位格之认知（the knowledge of the divine persons）Aquinas说：“不可能用自然理性获知天主三位或天主位格的数目为三。…人藉着自然理性只能经由受造物认识天主。…用自然理性所能认知天主者，是那些属于天主本质本体之唯一或一体者，而不是那些属于天主位格的区别或分别属于不同位格者。那些企图以自然理性证明天主三位或天主位格之数目为三者，在两方面减损或贬斥了信德。”【472】“在天主内有五项表记（notio/notions），即非产生性、父性、子性、共发和出发。”【480】后面暂时略掉。江绪林 2012年10月15日星期一 -
版本推荐WEDNESDAY, JULY 21, 2010Quaeritur: What is the Best Edition of the Summa?Quaeritur: What is the absolute best pre-Vatican II edition of the Summa Theologica of St Thomas, in Latin. And please don't just say the Leonine. I want a publisher, and a year of publication. My ideal edition would be very developed, bring us right up to Vatican II, with tons of excellent footnotes, commentary, and scholia. Would it be Cajetan commentary? I don't know. You would know. Let me know. Let us all know, please. My ideal edition would also be in as few volumes as possible. If my ideal edition is not your ideal edition, please compare contrast, elucidate, and extrapolate. Thanks for your help professor.Respondeo: In my opinion, there is no single, perfect edition; there are only many different good versions, each of which has its advantages and disadvantages.1. The best text is that of the Leonine edition (pictured); this is the best critical edition (best critical apparatus), and it also has the advantage that it includes Cajetan's commentary. It has the disadvantage of being enormously voluminous (9 huge vols + index), out of print, and very expensive (unless you get the PDF from ITOPL). I use this work only for articles and books that I intend to publish, or for Cajetan's Commentary:Sancti Thomae Aquinatis. Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita, t. 4-12: Summa theologiae Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, Romae, 1888-1889.2. The best as far as bibliography is the St. Paul edition: it includes extensive bibliography for every treatise and question, plus great footnotes. It also has the advantage of being a single (though rather large and heavy) volume:Sancti Thomae de Aquino. Summa theologiae. Editiones Paulinae, Alba-Roma, réimprimée souvent à partir des années 1955.3. Now, neither the Leonine edition nor the St. Paul edition is really the most useful for casual study and research. In my opinion, the best as far as study tools (outlines of parts, generous anthology of commentators, etc.) is the Marietti edition:Sancti Thomae de Aquino. Summa theolgiae. Ed. Petrus Caramello. Taurini: Marietti, 1952.4. But these three versions so far are far too bulky and uncomfortable to take out of your library. The best version, in my opinion, as far as size, weight, and feel of the volumes, is the Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos (BAC) edition. I like this version because I can easily take any one of the five volumes on the road with me and read it any time I have a break, without it being too burdensome (as far as weight and size) and it is also quite sturdy so it does not get damaged easily. This version is not to be confused with the Spanish translation (or the bilingual version) of the Summa, both published by BAC:Sancti Thomae de Aquino. Summa theologiae. Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1995.5. Now, all four versions so far only contain the Latin text. If your Latin needs a little help (as is the case with most of us) the best side-by-side Latin-English version is that by NovaAntiqua:Saint Thomas Aquinas. Summa theologiae. Scotts Valley, CA: Create Space, 2009.N.B.: For those who are not planning on being professional Thomistic scholars, for those whose Latin is not solid enough to handle the Latin alone, and those who just want one version, I would recommend they get the NovaAntiqua version. For more serious scholars, I would urge them to get them all or most of them (the Leonine is a must, at least on PDF).Request: If you ever scan the St. Paul or Marietti editions (or anything else), please feel free to share those files with me, as they can be immensely helpful.A Philosophical Summary of the Summa TheologiaeFew secondary sources focus exclusively on the Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas Aquinas; and of those that do, none of them, to my knowledge, investigate it solely from a philosophical point of view. For example, Edward J. Gratsch's book, Aquinas's Summa: An Introduction and Interpretation (1985), was written more for students of theology than for philosophers; and Jean-Pierre Torrell's book, Aquinas's Summa: Background, Structure, and Reception (2005), is more historical in its approach, spending a good deal of time on Aquinas's Christian, Greek, Jewish, and Arab sources. Brian Davies, however, has remedied this situation by collecting eleven essays, written by a group of distinguished scholars, into a single volume that covers "the key philosophical positions defended by Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae" (p. xiii). In doing so, he has produced a useful tool for contemporary philosophers interested in Aquinas.The order of the essays is based on the first two parts of the Summa Theologiae itself. The third part is not covered because, as I alluded to earlier, Davies's goal is to "look at the philosophy in the Summa by focusing on sections of the work in which Aquinas is not dealing with uniquely Christian notions" (p. xii). Thus three of the first five chapters of Davies's book examine God, the next four chapters cover anthropology, and the last two chapters focus on morality. With the exception of a short introduction, written by Davies himself, none of these essays were newly written for the book. In fact, four of them are twenty-five years old, or older, and only three of them were written within the last five years. This, combined with the introductory character of many of the chapters, makes it clear that the book is primarily intended for newcomers to Aquinas and not specialists, who, in all likelihood, have already read these essays and are familiar with much of the content.So, does the book succeed as an introductory text? On the positive side, the chapters are generally clear and well written and they often bring Aquinas's thought into dialogue with contemporary philosophy and science. Let me highlight a few examples concerning science first. In chapter 2, Victor White replies to several common objections to Aquinas's five ways of proving God's existence and in the course of doing so explains the important differences between Aquinas's five ways and William Paley's watchmaker argument. This, no doubt, will be of interest to those following the intelligent design movement. In chapter 3, John Wippel, at length and meticulously, examines each of the five ways. When discussing the first way he spends a few pages considering it in light of objections based on the principle of inertia in modern physics. Finally, in chapter 6, Robert Pasnau gives a lengthy and detailed discussion of the substantial unity of body and soul, briefly noting some of the problems that modern chemistry poses for Aquinas's views on substance.With respect to contemporary philosophical issues, in chapter 9 Eleonore Stump gives an excellent account of Aquinas's views on human freedom that will certainly be of interest to those following contemporary discussions of compatibilism and libertarianism. In chapter 11, Fergus Kerr examines different and incommensurable readings of Aquinas's views on natural law and morality, discussing how different groups of contemporary philosophers and theologians have tried to appropriate Aquinas's theory. Finally, in chapter 4, Peter Geach attempts to explain Aquinas's real distinction between form and existence using the resources of analytic philosophy, especially the work of Gottlob Frege.The book is not, however, without its faults. There are inconsistencies in style and the continuity between chapters is not as smooth as it could be. For example, some understanding of the doctrine of analogy is presupposed in the second chapter, yet the doctrine of analogy is not explained until the fifth chapter. Because the chapters were taken from different sources, this is understandable. However, the inclusion of an index would have at least partially alleviated this problem and would have also been helpful given the fact that readers will be tempted to peruse only the chapters that interest them since the chapters are arranged topically.Also helpful would have been the inclusion of a short glossary of key terms, along the lines of what Peter Kreeft did in his book, A Summa of the Summa (1990). Aquinas uses many of Aristotle's terms in addition to his own technical terms, and the chapters of Davies's book often contain these in both English and Latin. Davies is aware of the problem, and in his introduction he warns the reader that "Aristotle's teaching on substance, form, accidents, matter, act, and potentiality … is not easily summarized, and I shall not attempt to expound it here" (p. xiii). In a later endnote he refers the reader to three secondary sources. Nevertheless, since Davies's book is aimed at newcomers to Aquinas, adding a glossary and an index would greatly increase its usefulness. I recommend the inclusion of both should a second edition be produced.Whereas the above faults are minor, there is, in my estimation, one very serious flaw in the book. Except for a handful of pages in the chapter written by Wippel, no chapter discusses the existential revolution in metaphysics for which Aquinas is famous. Thomas's understanding of being (esse) as the act of existing (actus essendi) is the core of his thought, including the Summa Theologiae, and it is virtually absent from this book. This absence is also apparent in the list of suggested readings provided by Davies at the end of the book. With the sole exception of The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, we find no books or articles by Etienne Gilson, Jacques Maritain, or Joseph Owens, the main proponents of the existential interpretation.The reason for this is that Davies's plan was to put together a book that would appeal to members of the Anglo-American tradition of philosophy. The list of suggested readings and, indeed, the cast of contributors themselves make it clear that this is a work of analytical, not existential, Thomism. Analytical Thomism is a relatively recent movement that approaches the philosophy of Aquinas through the resources of analytic philosophers such as Frege, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Saul Kripke. As I mentioned earlier, Geach, in chapter 4, relies on the work of Frege to explain Aquinas's real distinction between form and existence.Davies has every right, of course, to compile a book on the Summa Theologiae from the perspective of analytical Thomism. However, since the book is aimed at newcomers to Aquinas, I feel he also has a duty to inform his readers that there are other interpretations of Aquinas, and to provide some sources for further study in the suggested readings. The existential interpretation is simply too important to ignore. Indeed, Joseph Owens has argued persuasively that earlier interpretations of Thomas's metaphysics come to their "full flower" in the existential interpretation.[1]In closing, I want to make it clear that I am not unsympathetic to analytical Thomism. Indeed, I think its emphasis on modern logic and the clarification of language and concepts has much to offer Thomism, as long as the key metaphysical contributions of Aquinas remain intact. On this last point, I share the concern expressed by Brian J. Shanley:"There is cause for optimism then about the stimulus to Thomism that could come from Analytical Thomism.... [H]owever, the major cause for concern is metaphysical. At the heart of Aquinas's philosophy is his understanding of being as ultimately rooted in esse as actus essendi. This does not fit with analytical metaphysical dogmas. Here then is where the ultimate test of allegiance lies. It is possible, of course, to be an analytic philosopher who offers interesting readings of Aquinas without any commitment to his doctrine of being. But I would not call such a one a Thomist, nor, I presume, would he call himself one. What I am arguing is that to be a Thomist of any stripe requires some primary commitment to Thomas's metaphysics; without that commitment, one may be an interpreter or even a specialist, but one is not a Thomist. It is a matter of debate, of course, what other doctrines of St. Thomas one must adhere to in order to be a Thomist and surely the items are broader than the metaphysics of esse. But however one draws the Thomistic circle, the core must be esse in St. Thomas's sense, not Frege's."[2]Notes[1]. Joseph Owens, St. Thomas and the Future of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1957), 36.[2]. Brian J. Shanley, "Analytical Thomism," The Thomist 63 (1999): 125-137, 136-137.阅读入门SATURDAY, JANUARY 28, 2012A better way of reading the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas January 28th, Feast of St. Thomas AquinasThe Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas is, without question, the greatest work of theology ever written. And yet, because of the length of the treatise – some six hundred fifteen question of up to six or even eight articles, in three (or four) volumes – even the most avid fans of the Angel of the Schools find it difficult to read the whole Summa.In this post, we intend to give an indication of not only how to read any particular portion of the Summa, but also of how to succeed in reading the whole work.The structure of the Summa TheologicaSt. Thomas’ Summa is divided into four parts: the first part, Summa Theologica I (ST I); the first part of the second part (ST I-II); the second part of the second part (ST II-II); and the third part (ST III), to this is added the “Supplement” completed by Reginald of Piperno from St. Thomas’ early writings.1) The first part (ST I) considers God, the Trinity, and creation (especially men and angels). 2a) The first part of the second part (ST I-II) deals with morals in general – considering everything from happiness, to virtue and vice, as well as the gifts of the Holy Spirit and grace. 2b) The second part of the second part (ST II-II) is on specific moral theology – dealing with the virtues and vices in particular, and also with vocational callings. 3) Finally, the third part (ST III) considers Christ Jesus himself and also the sacraments he instituted. 4) Lastly, there is the “Supplement” which was added to the Summa, since St. Thomas never finished this work – the Supplement deals with some of the sacraments and also considers the end of time and the second coming of our Savior (it is made up from the commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard which St. Thomas made as a young man).How to read a portion of the SummaThe Summa is divided into questions, which are sub-divided into articles. Thus, for example, the thirty-fourth question of the third part considers the perfection of the Christ in his conception and is divided into four articles [read the question here]: ST III, q.34, a.1 – Whether Christ was sanctified in the first instant of his conception?a. 2 – Whether Christ as man had the use of free-will in the first instant of his conception?a. 3 – Whether Christ could merit in the first instant of his conception?a. 4 – Whether Christ was a perfect comprehensor in the first instant of his conception?When considering any particular article, we notice that there are essentially four parts: Objections (videtur), appeal to authority (sed contra), theological proof (respondeo), and replies to objections (dicendum quod).Now, it is helpful to the modern mind that, when reading any particular article, we begin first by reading the first words of the first objection: In the case of ST III, q.34, a.2 [read the article here], the first objection begins, “It would seem that Christ as man had not the use of free-will in the first instant of his conception.” Because this is an objection which will be disproven, this means that the basic answer which St. Thomas gives is that our Lord did have the use of free-will even in his humanity from the first moment he was conceived in the womb of his Mother.Then, without reading the rest of the objections, we proceed to the sed contra, or “On the contrary” (in which St. Thomas will appeal to an authority to settle the issue). In this particular case, St. Thomas appeals to St. Augustine (though really to St. Gregory the Great) who writes (Regist. Ix, Ep. 61): “As soon as the Word entered the womb, while retaining the reality of his nature, he was made flesh, and a perfect man.” St. Thomas concludes, “But a perfect man has the use of free-will. Therefore Christ had the use of free-will in the first instant of his conception.”From this we clearly see the basic answer of St. Thomas: Our Lord, even as an embryo in the womb, was in full possession of his rational faculties including the freedom of his will.Next, we consider the “I answer that”, which is the body of the argument. This is the most important portion of the article, since it is here that St. Thomas will explain the theological point in question.Finally, we return to the objections and consider each together with St. Thomas’ replies. Thus the over-all plan for each article is as follows:1) First sentence of the first objection.2) “On the contrary”3) “I answer that”, or body of the article4) Objections and replies(those interested in a further discussion of the theological point of this article – that Christ, from the moment of his conception, had attained to the use of reason – may consider our previous articles [here] and [here])Two methods of reading the Summa TheologicaThere are two popular ways of attempting to read the Summa of St. Thomas, but neither is often successful. First, there is the “curious” or “casual” approach to the Summa. This is the habit of picking up the Summa at random and opening to a particular question without reading anything of the immediate context. For example, one might hear that St. Thomas believes that war can sometimes be justified and so turns to ST II-II, q.40, without considering anything of the context of the question (that, for example, St. Thomas deals with war as a vice contrary to the theological virtue of charity).Now, I do not intend to completely discredit this first approach to the Summa – even if it is a bit “curious” (which, according to the Angelic Doctor, is a vice contrary to temperance [cf. ST II-II, q.167]), at least the reader is exposed to something of St. Thomas’ thought!There is a second approach which goes to the opposite extreme: Some will attempt to read the whole Summa by starting at the very beginning and reading word for word through the whole work. Generally, such an approach becomes extremely laborious, and the individual gives up somewhere around the discussion of man’s spirit and nature (in ST I, q.75 and following). While this second approach respects the internal structure of the Summa, and is surely the best method, as following the system intended by St. Thomas himself; it can tend to be a bit dry and very tedious.Another (better) way of reading the SummaI would like to present one way of reading the Summa which combines something of a methodological system together with topics of interest to the modern man. It is possible to read the Summa from back to front – many would find the Summa much more interesting if they began with the end and read backwards to the beginning. Let me explain.I would suggest starting with the third part, questions twenty-seven through fifty-nine, which deal with the life of Christ and are closely related to the Scriptures. This portion of the Summa (a part which many people do not even realize exists) deals with the various events and mysteries in our Savior’s life, death, and resurrection. Thus, it is far more interesting to the modern man than the more theoretical discussions of the first part.Now, starting with the treatise on the life of Christ, one could read the Summa backwards by taking the time to look up all of the references which St. Thomas makes to earlier questions and articles – the Angel of the Schools regularly references earlier portions of the Summa and, when reading the questions dealing with Jesus’ life on earth, one could pause after each article and take the time to look up all the citations to earlier articles in the Summa. In this manner, one would be reading the Summa backwards – but the study would be very interesting, since it would be driven by the Scriptural account of Jesus’ life. Each time an earlier portion of the Summa is cited, one could go back and read that article, and then could continue to go back further still to read any previous articles which are cited.Let us take an example: ST III, q.34, a.2 – Whether Christ as man had the use of free-will in the first instant of his conception? In this article, St. Thomas refers to a.1 of the same question, as well as to ST III, q.33, a.2, and ST III, q.11, a.2. Taking the reference to the question immediately previous (q.33), which refers to an article in which St. Thomas shows that our Lord possessed a human soul from the first instant of his conception, we then are directed to ST III, q.6, a.1 and 2). In the second article of question six, one is directed to the first part of the Summa (ST I, q.62, a.8; q.64, a.2). Thus, we have been led from the consideration of the life of Christ to the treatise on the Incarnation (III, q.6) to the treatise on the angels (I, q.62 and q.64). From here, we could continue to proceed further back still!A plan for reading the SummaPersonally, I would recommend beginning with ST I, q.1, a.1-10. This question serves as a prologue for the rest of the Summa and stands on its own.After the first question, one might proceed to ST III, qq.27-59, which deal with the life of Jesus (and are particularly Scriptural in nature). Looking up the citations to previous questions in the Summa would cover well the treatise on the Incarnation (III, qq.1-26) and also a good portion of the first part of the Summa.After the treatise on the Incarnation, I recommend proceeding to the treatise on the Sacraments: ST III, qq.60 – Suppl. q.68. Then, fall back to the treatise on virtues: ST II-II. If one were to look up all the references in the second part of the second part of the Summa, the first part of the second part would be well covered.After all of this, looking up references all along, it would be good to skim through the whole of the Summa from start to finish, taking extra time with any article or question which is unfamiliar. Special attention should be given to the treatises on the Trinity (I, qq.27-43), on the angels (I, qq.50-64), on grace (I-II, qq.109-114), on the Incarnation (III, qq.1-16), and on the Eucharist (III, qq.73-83).These portions of the Summa contain the most significant insights of the Angelic Doctor.St. Thomas Aquinas, Pray for us! -
有幸掌过两眼，提两点小意见：一是翻译的问题教廷对阿奎那的评价自然是极高，但是该书译为“圣门孔夫子”未免骇人听闻，我不相信梵蒂冈在赞自己的圣人时会用异教徒的祖师爷来比喻，我以为这种本土化的翻译未免过于大胆。出国前，郝老师说，阿奎那，西方之朱熹，我觉得定位更准确。阿奎那非开山祖师，不可誉为孔夫子一也；阿奎那属于理学派，与朱熹相似二也；阿奎那与朱熹皆面临异教思想之挑战，出入其中，终能采阳补阴，发扬本宗以综合之，三也。二是阿奎那生平中不应夹带私货阿奎那生平年表严格说，从生到死就好，如果要将教廷封圣写入也无不妥，毕竟天主教是相信有灵魂的，教廷有祝圣的权力。但是硬将台湾的翻译事业，乃至参加学术会议等等都塞进去，未免有些……须知，虚荣乃七罪之一。
精彩短评 (总计7条)
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非常优秀的翻译！ -
上帝的要是不只存在于圣经之中。 -
圣奥斯定的忏悔录是圣经最好的神学注释，圣阿奎那的神学大全是圣经最好的哲学注释。 -
大开眼界！ -
15.08.14标至今。先于拉丁文本读完。以后有空还需再研读一遍。 -
想着如果我现在不马个“读过”，基本上这辈子都没这个机会了hhhh beyond my comprehension -
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