喇嘛王国的覆灭
出版社:时事出版社
出版日期:1994-06-01
ISBN:9787800092190
作者:梅﹒戈尔斯坦
书籍目录
上篇
十三世达赖喇嘛和热振当政时代
第一章 十三世达赖喇嘛的童年
第二章 西藏与新兴的中华民国
第三章 十三世达赖喇嘛、藏军与寺院集团
第四章 十三世达赖喇嘛圆寂
第五章 土登贡培的垮台
……
下篇
大札和十四世达赖喇嘛当政时代
第十一章 大札摄政的初期：1941-1943
第十二章 第二次世界大战结束之前的形势变化与对抗
第十三章 反叛的种子
第十四章 热振阴谋
第十
作者简介
编辑推荐：本书详细叙述了1913-1951年西藏上层社会斗争史实，材料翔实，作者在西藏考察两年，访问了定居在印度的藏人和原先西藏任职的英国外交官，收集了丰富的第一手资料，同时作者大量引用了英国外交部档案、伦敦、印度事务部档案和美国国家档案等，剖析了西藏现代史上的重大历史事件产生的原因、发展过程及其影响，为达赖和班禅两大活佛失和、寺院集团和噶厦之间的冲突等。
发布书评
精彩书评 (总计2条)
-
700页的《喇嘛王朝的覆灭》我看完了经常是晚上计划看到12点睡觉 却还清醒的奔着2点去关于西藏的书 看过的不多关于西藏的故事 和 西藏这两个字所象征的意思感觉它完全被我们定位应该是 走 那种路线—— 就是往心走所以 它已然成一块圣地了 到了那 脱胎换骨是轻的 恍如隔世也正常 从疯凡世界拥来的人 似乎都想去那里下面的故事 是我从朋友的日记中看到的-----------------------------------------------------------------【一对日本恋人去拉萨旅行，女孩高反严重，几乎天天要去诊所打点滴，有个藏族男孩很喜欢这个女孩，每天都要路过诊所去看这个女孩，女孩的病情不见好转，男孩就围着布达拉宫磕了十万个长头为女孩祈福，磕了三个月。也怪，三个月后女孩的病情开始好转。先不论故事的真假性，想说，在我们生病的时候，有没有人愿意为我们磕这十万个长头。另一个故事，一位拉卜楞的活佛被朋友邀去合作玩，活佛穿了便装第一次进KTV唱歌，在KTV遇见一位长辫姑娘，一见倾心。因为着便装，辫子姑娘不知眼前这位帅气高大的男人是活佛，也爱上了他。后来辫子姑娘得知她爱的人是活佛，便哭着跪在了活佛面前……后来活佛去了姑娘家里，对姑娘的家人说，我会还俗，娶她。活佛一个人在大经堂呆了整整一天一夜，第二天一早经过一系列还俗仪式后活佛走出了拉卜楞，期间没有掉一滴眼泪。可是，跨出寺院大门后，活佛转身对着拉卜楞大哭一场。】-------------------------------------------------------------------------喇嘛王朝的故事 不走这线路美国一人类学家即作者是企图要把一段真实的历史中立得讲清楚 有点 把人 从上面那种雪域高原的空灵中 拉出来让去看 和我们今天所配给西藏许多 唯美故事不同的 显残酷的历史作为十四世达赖喇嘛尚未长大 而摄政的 热振活佛本应独善其身 他和他情妇们的故事 在书中没走他的人性不知道是否也曾涉及一段活佛的爱情 在书中被描述为 类似荒淫无度的证据 并最终导致政权的丧失在被虔诚信仰的 转世活佛体系中涉及多次利益的交锋 用毒咒暗杀的 用武力镇压的 用勾心斗角算计的有着残忍的酷刑一个企图改革的人 一个作者眼里差点就可以促进体制改革而进步的人被最终挖掉双眼（不是直接挖 而是在头顶用一种方式敲振让眼珠自动掉下）有着很现实的分道扬镳九世班禅的出走 以及其和达赖喇嘛的来往信件中看出同为一脉的师徒 终也是利不同而道不同有着特有的形式在需要向英国、美国、印度、中国大陆派去各不同代表团求得帮助时是通过占卜 来决定谁去哪个国家 这故事 大概是不如前一种动人的 我这里 我都当真 不管 什么藏学家 史学家 怎么评价书本身对我而言 则是 除了愿意看到她不同世俗的美 也愿意接受她如常的拉屎放屁 -
BLACK ANNALS: Goldstein & The Negation Of Tibetan History （2）REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTSIn Marxist inspired narratives of feudal (or capitalist) states collapsing of their inherent contradictions, there should fittingly be a role for a revolutionary movement and perhaps even a revolutionary hero. Goldstein provides us a detailed thirteen-page account of the “Tibet Improvement Party”, which wanted to bring about a “revolutionary restructuring of the Tibetan government and society.” Goldstein lays out a great deal of information and material about this tiny organization, including a photograph of its three members, a full page reproduction of the Party emblem, a full page reproduction of the party’s membership card, and a partial reproduction of the party’s application form. The last was probably presented in reduced size to obscure the fact that half the text is in Chinese.The “Tibet Improvement Party”, was a Chinese government financed organization. The Tibetan name, nub bhod lekchoe kyidug or West Tibet Improvement Association, provides a clue as to the original language in which the name was composed, since the prefix “west” ( nub in Tibetan or xi in Chinese) to describe Tibet is only used in the Chinese word for Tibet, Xizang. The founder and leader of the organization Rabga Pangdatsang was a Guomindang officer. Rabga’s house in Kalimpong, Reli View, has a photograph of him in Nationalist army uniform, alongside other Guomindang officers.[1] A recently published study by a Taiwan scholar, using declassified Nationalist government files, clearly indicates the role of Rabga’s organization in Guomindang efforts to spy on Tibet and to subvert the Tibetan government. Hsiao-Ting Lin writes: “In an instruction to his military staff, Chiang Kai-shek finally ordered a monthly stipend of 100,000 yuan to be paid to Rabga … Chiang also instructed his secret service agents in Tibet, Xikang (Kham) and India to work closely with Rabga,who carried an official Chinese passport.”[2]But the West Tibet Improvement Society was pathetically ineffective in carrying out its revolutionary and conspiratorial agenda. Goldstein tells us that it printed thousand of membership forms and membership cards with insignium “that bore striking similarities to the Soviet Russian emblem.” But its membership apparently did not expand beyond its initial three members. At the conclusion of his lengthy account of the Party, Goldstein himself admits that “such a small group might seem unimportant …” but speculates, somewhat wistfully, that if it had allied itself with the “Reting forces” it might have posed “ … a real threat to the Lhasa government.” This organization is remembered by a few Tibetans today, only because the great scholar, Gedun Chophel, suffered incarceration in Lhasa due to his unfortunate association with it. When returning to Tibet from Kalimpong, he accepted some letters from Rabga, to be delivered to certain people in Lhasa suspected by Tibetan authorities of Guomindang connections. The British CID discovered this and Lhasa was informed, leading to Gedun Chophel’s arrest.REVOLUTIONARY MARTYRGoldstein is on more solid ground with the revolutionary hero of his history, the official, Lungshar Dorje Tsegyal, who undoubtedly played a major, though many older Tibetans would deem pernicious, role, in modern Tibetan politics. Goldstein claims Lungshar as “one of Tibet’s most progressive lay officials” who realized that “all political systems must adapt to a changing world.” At the conclusion of his history Goldstein notes that a critical turning point in Tibetan history “occurred four months after Reting’s appointment as regent when a lay official, Lungshar, attempted to reform the structure of the government.”Lungshar Dorje TsegyalThe myth of Lungshar as a progressive revolutionary hero has been around long before Goldstein’s book. Dawa Norbu, in his Red Star Over Tibet, states that “Tsepon Lungshar, the finance minister, led the ‘Young Tibet Group’ — a liberal democratic party. Lungshar, who had visited India and some European countries, including England, outlined some reform programmes with four of five of his colleagues in Lhasa. But this was leaked, and he was charged with treason; so his efforts to democraticize Tibet fizzled out.”[3] Dawa Norbu probably received this glowing but implausible account of Lungshar from Lungshar’s own son, Jangju la, who was teaching Tibetan language at Dr. Graham’s Homes in Kalimpong where Dawa Norbu studied.The present Dalai Lama, who likes to describe himself as “half Buddhist, half Marxist”, also appears to have bought into the myth of Lungshar as reformer and revolutionary. In a recently released (and somewhat namby-pamby) history of Tibet by Thomas Laird, the Dalai Lama is quoted as saying “Actually the Thirteenth Dalai Lama fully trusted Lungshar” and “… (his) main aim was that the Tibetan government should be led by officials and not by lamas. Lungshar said that lamas have no experience in administration and so forth.”[4]In the exile Tibetan world of the sixties and seventies there was a yearning, especially among students studying in elite Indian universities with fashionably left leanings, for some kind of leftist revolutionary role model in Tibetan history. Since nothing like that had existed in old Tibet, Lungshar was inducted, probably since he appeared to possess some anti-colonial and anti-imperialist bona fides. These were established, as it were, by the fact that official British reports about him were unfavorable, even hostile, and also by the fact that the Tibetan cabinet had charged him with “plotting to overthrow the government and replace it with a Bolshevik system.”Actually, if one reviews just the raw data that Goldstein lays out about Lungshar, and disregards his interpretation, it becomes immediately clear that far from being a progressive or a reformist, Lungshar was the most effective player on the ultra-conservative and reactionary side of Tibetan politics. He was, as Goldstein’s own information clearly points out, the chief factor in undermining the modern Tibetan military, the reforms of the 13th Dalai Lama, and by logical extension the defense of the nation against the Chinese invasion.Goldstein tells us that at the outset of the modernization period, Tibetan politics was divided into two camps: the new military under the commander-in-chief, Tsarong which was “committed to modernization” and the “ultra-conservative” monastic segment allied with reactionary officials, led by the monk official Tempa Dhargay, who was also the Dalai Lama’s chamberlain (dronyerchemo).Dronyerchemo "apso" Tempa DhargayGoldstein clearly states that Lungshar had “tactically allied” himself with the ultra-conservative group. The leader of the conservative group, Tempa Dhargay, was known to his monk colleagues by the complementary nickname, Ara Karpo or “white beard”. The military officers and lay officials who despised him called him dronyerchemo Apso – after the shaggy Tibetan terrier. Surprisingly Goldstein makes no mention of the pejorative “Apso” and writes as if he were only known as “white beard”. While this may not be evidence of Goldstein’s sympathy for the ultra-conservatives, it does point to where most of his information might have come from.Lungshar’s first opportunity to weaken the powerful new military power bloc and set back the modernization drive came in 1920 when he cunningly instigated a political crisis that weakened the new army. The standard account of this incident has been that arrogant military officers forced their way into a meeting of the National Assembly. This has unfortunately created a lasting impression that something like an attempted military coup took place — on the lines of the seizure of the Cortes, the Spanish Parliament, in 1981 by members of the Guardia Civil. Shakabpa mentions, quite mistakenly, that Tsarong personally led this group of officers to the National Assembly. More recent studies, including Goldstein’s, reveal that that nothing of the sort happened, and that the officer’s conduct, though perhaps ill advised, was in fact harmless — perhaps even legitimate. It was blown out of all proportions by the conservatives, instigated by Lungshar.In early March of 1920, the National Assembly was discussing the funding of the army. According to Goldstein “the anti-military clique arranged to exclude all military officers as delegates”. Unlike an elected modern parliament, the old Tibetan National Assembly required the attendance not only of government officials, abbots and representatives of the “Three Seats”, representatives of various classes and craft guilds, “but also representatives of the military”[5]. Excluding military delegates was an unusual action.Tsarong Dasang Damdul, Commander-in-Chief.According to a biography of Tsarong by his son, some officers went to the Assembly building and asked to meet the Assembly secretary to enquire why they had been excluded. They requested a meeting outside the chambers since according to “… government protocol, it would have been highly inappropriate to approach the Assembly directly; therefore they requested to talk to a representative.”[6] Lungshar, standing in for the Assembly secretary that day, met them outside. Goldstein also makes it clear that the officers told Lungshar “that they had not come to demand to be admitted but only to inquire why military officers had been excluded.”What Lungshar reported to the National Assembly is not clear. But it definitely appears that his report alarmed the Assembly delegates and put the body in a state of panic. Shakabpa and some others who have written about this are clear that Lungshar instigated this uproar. Goldstein tells us that “Rumors spread that this might be the prelude to a coup or that the army might take action against specific opponents… Escalation of the incident occurred a few days later, when the leaders of the National Assembly informed Lonchen Sholkang (the prime minister) that they had suspended their meetings because they feared the military would try to kill them. This very serious charge by the anti-military forces cleverly forced the government to act.” This was the first in a number of incidents that weakened the military and its commander-in-chief, Tsarong, and elevated Lungshar’s political power. Behind all these Lungshar’s hand is clearly visible, but the military officers and Tsarong must share some blame for not treading the sensitive grounds of Tibetan politics more carefully.TIBET’S MILITARY MODERNIZERSNonetheless, whatever their limitations, it must be acknowledged that the officers of Tibet’s new army were the principal agents of modernization in Tibet at the time. Modernization is not necessarily an outcome of socialist or democratic change. In the case of Ataturk’s Turkey and Meiji Japan, there was a clear military impetus in the progressive reforms enacted in those nations. Tibet’s modernization should be discussed in the context of its time, and not from a present day liberal left viewpoint, which might consider the friendly relationship of the Tibetan officer class with the British (imperialists) to be ideologically incorrect. There appears to be a standing rule in much of “progressive” writing — propagandistic or otherwise — that nothing can be declared good, or modern, or democratic until it has the imprimatur of the left.Tibetan military officers. Dalai Lama's nephew Drumba is second from left, middle row.Old photographs of these Tibetan officers in European military uniforms striking martial poses (which might appear slightly ridiculous to contemporary viewers) have in some instances led to their accomplishments being belittled and overlooked. But one only has to look through photographs of Meiji officers, early Republican Chinese military officers and even the plump but dashing Enver Pasha, leader of the Young Turks, to realize that such uniforms and posturing were the fashion of the day in such circles.The Tibetan military men of that period seemed to have possessed a capacity not just for fighting, but for intelligence gathering, communications, civil administration and even diplomatic subtlety, which comes through nicely in this account of a minor incident in 1913. The British spy and explorer F.M. Bailey secretly entered southern Tibet to map the vast tracts of unexplored mountainous jungles where the Tsangpo finally turns south towards India. The area is not only impossibly rugged and hostile but inhabited by savages and headhunters. So Bailey and his companion were surprised to receive a missive from Tibetan military headquarters in Eastern Tibet:“The next morning, just as we were starting, a letter came for us from the Kalon Lama, Commander-in-Chief of the Tibetan Army. It was written from Pembar Gompa in Kham and had been sent to Showa. There it had been put in a fresh envelope, sealed and sent to Tsela, where it was sealed up in another cover and dispatched to us. The total effect was very impressive. It was to ask us who we were and what we were doing; and to make sure that we couldn’t say that we were unable to read it, an English translation was attached.”[7]At a time when even with spy satellites, GPS systems, predator drones and what not, intelligence failure is not uncommon, such low tech, unassuming but real capability might be regarded as fairly remarkable.THE RISE AND FALL OF LUNGSHARLungshar finally managed to get Tsarong removed as commander-in-chief by playing on the ambitions of Drumba, the Dalai Lama’s young nephew, who was second-in-command. Lungshar encouraged him to complain to the Dalai Lama about Tsarong and to accuse him of plotting to “overthrow the Government”. When Drumba became commander-in-chief, Lungshar, according to Shakabpa, was “appointed Defense Secretary”. Rinchen Dolma Taring mentions “It was rumoured that Lungshar had schemed to have such a weak person made Commander-in-Chief.” Of course Mrs. Taring is not unbiased in the matter, but this conjecture about Drumpa’s rise was fairly widespread in Lhasa society then. Drumpa was a lazy inefficient official and the Dalai Lama later dismissed him from government service and Lungshar took full control of the military. According to K. Dhondup “As commander-in-chief and Finance Minister, Lungshar had reached the zenith of his power.”Lungshar’s arrogance and recklessness almost brought Tibet to the brink of war with Nepal in 1929, over the minor case of “Sherpa” Gyalpo, who, in contravention of Tibetan law had been selling tobacco in Lhasa. Gyalpo, claiming Nepalese nationality sought asylum at the Nepalese Legation in Lhasa, but Lungshar, rashly disregarding diplomatic nicety and Nepal’s legitimate treaty rights (of 1856), decided to use force to settle the matter. A Nepalese historian claims that “90 Tibetan military officials stormed in the legation while 1300 troops surrounded its compound.”[8] An outraged Nepal prepared for war and only after significant British intervention was a real conflict narrowly averted. This diplomatic debacle and Lungshar’s own haughty and abrasive behavior with other officials gradually eroded his power base and contributed to his dismissal as commander-in-chief.Kunphel la, the chief attendant of the Dalai Lama now began to emerge as a major political force. Kunphel la had created the Drongdak Magar (or regiment of better families) recruited from the lesser nobility and well-to-do peasants.Drongdak commanders Tashi Dhondup Yuthok & Jigme TaringJigme Taring, the junior commander, was very proud of his regiment and told me that the that the inspiration for it had come from the British tradition of “gentleman’s regiments,” and it was hoped that it might possibly become a future selection ground for a professional officer corps. Initially there was much resistance from the recruits, who were not amenable to military discipline and wanted to go home. But Goldstein makes overmuch of the stories of recruits bewailing the cutting of their long hair. Conscript soldiers the world over probably respond in the same way to such regimentation. Stanley Kubrick in Full Metal Jacket amply demonstrates the similar reaction of young American marine draftees to having their hippie locks shorn, before being shipped off to Vietnam.Kunphel la lavished special treatment on the soldiers and with new weapons and equipment, smart uniforms and rigorous training and drill, the regiment slowly developed into an effective force — with perhaps even a kind of espirit de corps of its own. F. W. Williamson, the British political officer, inspected the regiment in 1933 and was impressed. “Outside the regular units of the British and Indian armies, I have never seen such smartness and precision,” he wrote in a report to the government
精彩短评 (总计28条)
-
对于了解清末开始的雪域变迁，是本不错的书，虽然视角观点立场均不同于我过传统主张～ -
看文件有什么卵用 -
超级厚一本,死活没看完 -
看看吧。关于西藏近代史如此相近，客观的分析。。。虽然不会了解西藏的文化，但是却足以了解西藏的政治。 -
看了Black Annal之后不好评价了。算是很成体系的一家之言吧 -
资料很详实 -
一个布尔什维克洋人眼中的图博,,
最受不了把藏奸描写成"革命英雄" -
终于又啃完一本藏学的。欢乐一个。明天雪狮与龙。……2014年6月購二手書于台南草祭二手書店。 -
看过去稍微学术一点的西藏历史，不过实在看不懂，就翻过了。 -
这本书巨细靡遗地讲述了1913到1951年间的西藏现代史。作者结论是，喇嘛王国的覆灭，其原因是西藏统治者（特别是宗教界高层）拒绝现代化改革。但我觉得，如果要现代化，达赖喇嘛领导下的噶厦就没有存在的必要了，现代化让共产党来实现就好了。所以，这也算是宿命吧。 -
1950年前西藏的历史。。。 -
原来远远比我想像的复杂 -
两点读后感：西藏独立按道理来说说不过去。至于签订协议之后，有没有忽悠，这个不好说。 -
最早的版本，虽印刷质量无法与藏学社的版本媲美，但是比藏学社的多一些资料。 -
这是藏学家戈尔斯坦教授的《A History of Modern Tibetan: 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State》94年中译版。 -
非常好的一本书。 -
研究西藏历史和宗教的好书！ -
这本书和在路上一直都是我每年都试图读完的书……今年终于弃坑。 - 必读书目之一 看完只觉得政治真复杂 我看不懂
-
对了解西藏近现代史有一定帮助。 -
看完这本书，最直观强烈的感受是:“落后就要挨打”是铁律，四海皆准，概莫能外。另外，独特性也是要发展的，也是要大浪淘沙的，只有这样经历后的才是真的、自信的独特性。相反，固守的结局往往是被改变或消失。而那段“拒绝内部改变”的历史，最终被历史打上了“被外部改变”的标签，仅仅成为了过去的独特。 -
[PKU/preserved]K297.5/68 -
了解西藏不可多得的佳作 -
编辑推荐：本书详细叙述了1913-1951年西藏上层社会斗争史实，材料翔实，作者在西藏考察两年，访问了定居在印度的藏人和原先西藏任职的英国外交官，收集了丰富的第一手资料，同时作者大量引用了英国外交部档案、伦敦、印度事务部档案和美国国家档案等，剖析了西藏现代史上的重大历史事件产生的原因、发展过程及其影响，为达赖和班禅两大活佛失和、寺院集团和噶厦之间的冲突等。 -
可能是关于西藏近代史最细致严谨的史学著作，但对于非以研究目的为主的普通读者而言稍显无趣，因为包含很多当时历史文字材料，对于清末至达赖出逃期间西藏权力格局和社会面貌有详实且足够可信的展现。 -
政治立场对此书翻译的影响无疑是不可避免的。然而对于了解1913-1951期间的西藏政教合一制度的运作及其为争取独立地位却最终以接受17条而宣告失败的整个过程依然利大于弊。不过倒是希望可以拿着原版比对着再看一遍，看政治这个小丑怎样在语种之间搬弄是非。 -
借阅，已购新版 -
喇嘛王朝走向覆灭，那是它自身安排的归宿……